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Growth and convergence in the Central and East 







The main focus of the paper is the growth process in transition countries in the 
period 1992-2002, by using the production function approach. The empirical 
cross-section study performed found that initial life expectancy and net savings 
speed up growth while death rate, inflation, and terms of trade hamper the 
increase in GDP. The paper also aims at providing policy implications, e.g. better 
spending in the legal system, healthcare and social security could help 
governments foster the restructuring process and decrease the effect of the 
mistakes made in the past. 
 




Economic growth is a relatively recent field of study, although Adam Smith 
mentions the subject in 1776 in his famous book The Wealth of Nations. That is 
maybe the most interesting topic in development economics nowadays. A single-
digit number of growth per year may not seem to make a big difference when 
viewed on an annual basis, but it makes a significant change for the next 
generations. That is why economists are interested in what drives the phenomenon 
that brings such “extraordinary beneficial consequences” (Ray, 1997).  
In economic terms, growth is the result from diverting resources from 
current consumption in order to finance investment, which is a way to enhance 
future production. That would mean more future consumption as well. The higher 
the level of output, the higher the income, since everything produced belongs to 
somebody in the economy. The sources of income equal the expenditure on output 
(Sullivan, 2002). 
We observe a positive rate of economic growth when the level of new 
investment exceeds the rate of capital depreciation. Investment can be the new 
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equipment that overcompensates for the worn out machinery, when we talk about 
physical capital; or fresh graduates with better skills, who replace retired workers in 
the case of investment in human capital. This allows the cycle in the next period to 
occur at a larger scale; subsequently, economy expands. If the above mentioned 
condition is not fulfilled, the stagnation or even shrinking of the production results. 
After the fall of Communism, transition countries experienced a significant 
output fall. Spiraling inflation, ballooning deficits and huge external debts 
complemented this shock. The latter greatly impeded the expansion of the 
economy and resulted in lower incomes over time. 
The transition countries’ story is different from that of developing countries 
in a fundamental way. Countries in the region have already industrialised 
economies, the labour force has the technical expertise, and the capital base, 
although significantly depreciated, is in place. Large enterprises are also there. 
Transition countries are different, with their specific history setting, 
political environment and cultural features; nevertheless, they share many 
common characteristics. The best example is that the growth model that the Soviet 
regime imposed on the countries was based on an extensive, rather than intensive 
type of growth. Transition countries grew initially during Communism because of 
the increase in capital and labour force, not due to the increased productivity of 
inputs. As property rights were blurred, there were no incentives to improve 
technologically, to acquire new knowledge, or to establish new firms and thus 
create welfare. 
Roland (2000) suggests the important role played by the geo-political 
factor. According to him, economists could interpret transition as a very important 
geopolitical move, namely the shift to Central Europe and subsequently to the 
West. The danger of being left out of such a club acts as a credible threat, 
increasing the cost of policy reversals. That explains the mild transformation in 
the countries of Central Europe. Moreover, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
engaged in a race for being the most advanced transition country. The reward was 
the lion share of foreign direct investments. The prize was luring enough to 
stimulate the rapid development of credible transformation. 
For the transition countries to catch up with the developed ones, market-
based reforms should be carried on to the end. In a similar way to developing 
countries in the case of infectious diseases there is a bundle of viruses that have 
to be exterminated in order to efficiently decrease mortality rates. The situation in 
transition countries is much similar. There is a threshold package of reform 
measures that have to be carried out in order for the economy to boost up. 
Otherwise, partial reform makes no good. It usually increases inequality and 
poverty among citizens. Interest groups prevent further reforms because they will 
decrease the rents that could be extracted. The benefits cannot spill over the low-
income layer of society. 
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There should be a massive and consistent fiscal boost at all levels in the 
spheres of education and law. They would provide the basis for institutional 
stability. It takes time to build stable institutional framework but it is a necessary 
prerequisite for sustainable growth. The annual output growth of 4-5% is 
remarkable but when the production is compared to its pre-transition level, it 
becomes obvious that most of the countries are still on the starting line of the road 
to market economy. Moreover, most of the countries have to do a better job in 
order to catch up with the European Union (EU) states. 
The specific geographical and historical factors acted as boosters to 
development of some countries and setbacks for others. Central European 
countries such as Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic demonstrated amazing 
results. They started early and carried out structural reforms in a timely manner. 
The physical proximity to Western Europe supported the large inflow of foreign 
investment. More importantly, they were not under totalitarian regimes of the 
Soviet type. 
This kind of command economy had a devastating effect on the countries 
in the Balkans and the republics from the former Soviet federation. The party 
direction erases all forms of social organization. It took all the power from people, 
their ability to act in their own interest. Socialist planning debilitated people so 
that they could be governed easier.  
There should be a careful sequencing of the economic policy. Professor 
Rant explained in a talk show from January 2004 on the Bulgarian Television bTV 
that politics/ policy building is like preparing a meal: you need the right 
ingredients first. Then they should be added in the right order and in the right 
proportions to produce the optimal mix.     
Competition policy should be among the first to be implemented in 
transition economies. Roland (2000) pointed out that privatization without a 
competitive framework developed monopolies that in most of the cases had 
enough power to capture the state apparatus and prevent the introduction of a 
competition policy, as well as any other measures that did not suit their interests. 
That is the embarrassing evidence from the first decade of transformation 
and transition to a market-based economy. Politics was the driving force of reform 
instead of economic reasoning. A lot of people at the top engaged in spontaneous 
privatisation and tunnelling. This led to the establishment of oligarchs, newly rich 
businessmen running big enterprises in an inefficient manner. They do not exert 
optimal effort as long as they capture an excessive share of their relevant market. 
Still, their lobbies in the government are so powerful that they direct the course of 
the economic policy, or a lack of it. 
Some scholars (cited in Roland, 2000) warned against the macroeconomic 
consequences of giveaway privatisation. Every citizen received vouchers, which 
were used to buy shares in state enterprises. Unfortunately, in the case of Russia 
and Bulgaria, mass privatisation deprived government of most of the assets. Too 
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little cash entered the budget. Moreover, the inability and in most of the cases, 
slowness in creating an efficient tax administration led to breakdown. This caused 
a general insecurity of property rights. To reverse such a situation is very difficult 
because the strong industrial groups use the weakness of the government to block 
any reform in taxation. Few strategic investors with technical know-how were 
attracted to the country. From state monopolies, enterprises turned into private 
monopolies, with almost no change in their governance structure and no 
significant investment. 
There is some light at the end of the tunnel after all. Thanks to continuing 
discussions with IMF experts, macroeconomic stability was achieved, a stop was 
put to most protectionist tariff regimes, and trade was liberalised, together with 
tight budget requirements, that led to better management of the country resources 
on an aggregate level. Unfortunately, those countries have to start from scratch in 
building markets and establishing suitable institutions. 
This paper studies the factors for growth in ex-communist countries in the 
period 1992-2002. Although there is significant variation in growth performance 
across the countries, they share a lot more similarities than differences. The main 
focus of the empirical study is the growth process in transition countries. 
This paper studies those factors that influenced growth, by taking the 
production function approach. The main goal is to explain the expansion on the 
economies in transition over the last decade. We also aim at revealing policy 
implications that could help governments foster the restructuring process and 
decrease the effect of the mistakes made in the past. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Part II briefly discusses the 
literature. Part III describes the model and data. Part IV explains the results. Part 
V concludes. 
 
2. Literature overview 
Robert Solow’s fundamental article (Solow, 1956) was the first to discuss 
economic growth. Solow assumes a standard neoclassical production function, 
which features diminishing returns to capital. The savings rate and population 
growth rate are considered exogenous, their values are taken as given. Solow 
shows that the level of output per capita in equilibrium depends on savings and 
population growth rate. With different rates of savings and population growth rate, 
different countries reach different steady states. The higher the savings rate, the 
richer the country, while the higher the population growth rate, the poorer the 
country in per-capita terms. The model leaves a large portion of the growth 
unexplained, though. Soviet planners perceived this model as a policy menu, from 
which they could choose suitable values to achieve certain ends. 
Nelson and Phelps (1966) note that the process of education can be viewed 
as an investment in people, since they are bearers of human capital. The return to 
education is greater when complemented by technological progress in economy. 
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According to the authors, education produces positive externalities such as 
knowledge spillovers, so that the social benefit of education is much higher than 
the private one. 
 Barro (1991) comes forth with some regularities about growth, fertility and 
investment in his fundamental study. He uses the school-enrolment rates as a 
proxy to measure initial human capital, and finds this factor significant and 
positively related to growth. Also, countries with high human capital are usually 
the ones with low fertility rates and high ratios of physical investment to GDP. 
Barro finds government consumption as a proportion of GDP to hinder economic 
growth. He explains that phenomenon with the taxes imposed to afford such 
consumption and the distortions in agents’ behaviour that resulted thereof, e.g. 
decreased incentive for investment. He found price distortions to slow down 
growth, while public investment does not explain growth in the period he 
researched. Political instability is another factor that he finds significant in 
impeding growth. Insecure property rights have an adverse effect on the level of 
private investment. 
Mankiw (1992) find that a higher saving rate leads to higher income in 
steady state. That in turn leads to a higher level of human capital, even in cases 
where the rate of human-capital accumulation is held constant. Thus, they show 
that the higher saving rate raises total factor productivity (TFP). On the contrary, 
population growth lowers income per capita because the available capital is spread 
over a larger pool of workers. This implies that higher population growth lowers 
TFP. They explain the variation in income per capita to be determined by the 
cross-country difference in tax policies, education policies, fertility, and political 
stability.   
Fischer and Sahay (cited in Orlowski, 2000) run three panel regressions 
explaining growth performance with updated data from 1998. They contain two 
types of explanatory variables: macroeconomic policy variables (inflation and 
fiscal balance) and structural reform variables captured by the liberalization index, 
EBRD indices and the share of private sector. All three results confirm that the 
anti-inflation policies and structural reform policies were beneficial to growth. 
Authors conclude that price liberalization and small-scale privatization 
contributed more to growth than the large-scale one. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) find evidence of convergence in their 
sample, but only a conditional one. When initial school enrolment rates and 
government consumption/GDP are held constant, the rates of convergence are 
approximately the same as the ones they found for US states. With the same 
technology, the introduction of international capital markets speeds the 
convergence of output, but slows down the convergence for income per capita. 
According to them, that is due to the limited ability to borrow in order to finance 
accumulation of physical and human capital. On the other hand, mobility of labour 
and technology tends to speed up the predicted rate of convergence.  
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Empirical studies of growth often employ cross-national regressions. Along 
with capital and labour these studies include other variables, such as education as 
a proxy for human capital, inflation, political instability, democracy, population 
growth, latitude, and regional dummies. 
 
3. Model and data 
The model will try to capture both macroeconomic factors and some 
institutional and legal deficiencies. The econometric model we plan to test 
empirically is the following: 
iGrowth  + 1 Netsav + 2  90TOT + 3 Death  + 4 exLife _  + 5
GrM 2 +  
This is a standard linear multiple regression equation, which uses cross-
sectional data. Thus the author eliminates a possible correlation among the 
variables, as it is the case with time series data. Moreover, it is very difficult to 
find long series of data for an individual country. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method of estimation of the coefficients will yield unbiased, consistent and 
efficient estimates. 
A Breush-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for heteroscedasticity was 
performed as suggested in Ramanathan (1998): The main regression is run and the 
unstandardized residuals are saved. Then a new variable is computed by squaring 
them. An auxiliary regression was run, squared residuals being the dependent 
variable. The test statistic LM = nR2= 22*0.077 = 1.694, where n is the number 
of observations used in the estimation of the auxiliary regression and R2 is the 
unadjusted R2 from that regression. LM<
2 = 33.9244 with 22 degrees of 
freedom at 5% level of significance. So, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients in front of the variables are not significantly different from 0. 
That means there is no evidence to support the presence of heteroscedasticity, so 
OLS will be the estimation procedure, providing BLUE (best linear unbiased 
estimators).Below we provide a short description of the data used in the 
regression. The variables are from 90 and 91 (initial conditions) and explain the 
growth during the period 1992-2002. Thus the problem of simultaneity is avoided. 
 
GROWTH – is the average growth rate in GNI per capita in the period 1992-2000 
LIFE_EXP – life expectancy at birth is the number of years a new born infant 
would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of his birth were to stay 
the same throughout its life. Since the indicator is stable over the decade, the data 
is from the year 2000.  
NETSAV – gross national savings are calculated as the difference between GNI 
and public and private consumption, plus net current transfers; as a percentage of 
GNI 
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held by residents. 
TOT90 - net barter terms of trade in 1990 are calculated as the ratio of the export 
price index to the corresponding import price index measured relative to the base 
year 1995. 
DEATH - crude death rate is the number of deaths occurring during the year, per 
1,000 population estimated at midyear.  
M2GR – M2 aggregate comprises the sum of currency outside banks, demand 
deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and 
foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. 
This definition of the money supply corresponds to lines 34 and 35 in the 
International Monetary Fund's (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS). The 
change in money supply is measured as the difference in end-of-year totals relative 
to M2 in the preceding year.  
All the data, together with the definitions of the variables used, is from the 
CD ROM version of World Development Indicators 2003. 
 
4. Explanation of the results 
The table with the regression output is shown in Appendix I. The model’s 
R sq. is 57.9%, which indicates that the model explains a significant part of the 
growth rate. In other words, the mentioned percentage of the explained variance 
is successfully explained by the variables included in the regression, while the 
other 42.1% are due to errors or factors not included in the model. For cross-
section model, this indicates an acceptable model.  
 The joint significance F-test was also performed. We looked at the p-value 
of the F-statistic, which was close to zero. This means we can safely reject the 
hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero even at 1 % level of significance. 
 All the variables included in the model have individual explanatory power 
over growth in 1992-2002. Most of them are statistically significant at 1%, with 
the exception of TOT90 and M2GR, which are significant at 8% level of 
significance.  
 The constant term has a negative value. This implies that when we do not 
have any production resources, the output will fall year after year. That fact is 
consistent with our intuition: if we have some assets from the last years and we 
produce something using the same assets over the 10-year period, they will 
consequently deteriorate. The proceeds we would get in the subsequent years will 
be smaller and smaller. 
LIFE_EXP is an important contributor to growth. The longer the citizens 
of a particular country live, the greater the time they can provide the economy 
with the flow of labour services. The benchmark here is Switzerland where the 
life span is 80 years both for males and females.  
This variable suggests something about the quality of life as well. Aslund 
(2002) advocates the proposition that vodka in Russia was to blame for the 
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decreased male life expectancy in the years of transition. Looking at the table 10 
in the appendix, we note that almost all transition countries with the exception of 
Central European ones registered a drop in their male life expectancy levels. 
The explanation for that phenomenon is that there is little uncertainty in 
developed countries; everything there is well organized. In transition countries, 
however, institutions are still in a developing stage; they are not working in the 
most efficient way. Institutions in transition countries cannot provide the 
necessary level of security and certainty of outcome to the citizens. The fears 
about what will happen tomorrow cause distress and unrest in people, which 
decreases their life expectancy. 
Transition countries still have a high level of human capital that was 
developed under totalitarian regimes. Most of it, however, is not suitable for 
market conditions. While traditionally, people from the region have good 
quantitative skills, they severely lack marketing, entrepreneurial and customer 
service skills, which are the prerequisite for starting a small-scale business. With 
the contemporary educational expenditure cuts in the government budget, it may 
turn out that the high levels of human capital are unsustainable in the new 
environment. 
 A possible way to alleviate those negative effects is increased labour mobility. 
Thus a labourer could go to a place where the value of his services is the highest, 
together with the learning-by-doing phenomenon, that relocation of workers would 
augment the stock of knowledge. Labour mobility is still low in the countries from the 
region, though. The explanation for that phenomenon, besides the non-existent labour 
market, was the geographical concentration of particular industries that were built 
according to the central planning. Whole regions were dominated by a ‘dinosaur’, a 
monopolistic producer who provided employment to whole towns in a segmented 
market, protected with high state tariffs imposed on competitors and subsidies to loss-
making enterprises when needed.  
The rudimentary housing market exacerbated the problem. A worker was 
prevented from going to a factory where he could get a higher wage because he could 
not sustain his move there. His previous wage was received in kind and it incorporated 
social benefits such as vacations to state-owned resorts, health plans, etc. 
DEATH has a negative correlation with growth. The population of all 
transition countries features a high percentage of old people, currently between a 
quarter and a third. When combined with the low birth rates and high emigration of 
young people to the West, those statistics provide a worrisome trend for the future. 
The significant number of old people in the population will increase the 
demand for health services. The network of state hospitals, faced with severe 
budget cuts, would not be able to meet all their needs. The other option, which 
constitutes going to a private hospital, is still not up to the pocket of retired people. 
Seeking political support, finance ministers in transition countries often 
succumbed to the social pressure and allowed for higher spending in the health 
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care system (look at Table 12 in the appendix), which diverted funds that could 
have been channelled to worthwhile investment projects. In that case, a persistent 
increase in health expenditure could decrease future growth prospects. 
Moreover, there is a need for structural reform in the ways hospitals are 
managed. The subsidies should be discontinued. More should be spent on 
preventing instead on treating diseases. The whole image of the hospital as a 
dreadful place has to be changed. A person experienced in business should head 
for a hospital and not a doctor, as was the practice until recently. The viability of 
this option, however, depends on the development of the market for managers, 
which is still in its early stage.    
The social security system is burdened as well. The state budgets are 
already tight, and there is no way to increase pensions. Under the old system, 
called pay-as-you-go (PAYG), pensioners were promised by the government that 
they would be given the purchasing power to afford goods produced by younger 
people after their retirement (Barro, 2000). That kind of arrangement stated that 
current workers support current pensioners. In the initial years of transition, 
pension funds were the first ones to be depleted by government officials. Together 
with the fact that one current worker was supposed to contribute to the pensions 
of up to four retired people, it was a matter of time until the social security system 
was about to explode. 
Pensioners became an important social group that pressed for increase in 
pensions, thus blocking any attempt for market reform. They were enough in 
number to elect or dethrone governments. There was a need to change the way 
people in the region thought about pensions. Those were not something the 
government was obliged to grant, but rather based on the wage saving one has 
made during his working period. 
In some of the countries, e.g. Bulgaria and Kazakhstan, the three-pillar 
system was introduced (see Table 1.). 
This reform arrangement was proposed by Western advisors and was 
gradually implemented in the social safety net. The first pillar represented the old 
system, those born after 1969. The others, born after that year, were to choose a 
pension fund, where they contributed money for their future pensions. If they had 
no preference for one, a fund was appointed to them at random. That is a funded 
scheme based on the accumulation of financial assets through time. By saving part 
of the wage, a sum of money is built up, which will be used by the worker after 
s/he retires. The third pillar is optional, the worker can decide to contribute more 
now so that a higher pension will be received in the future. The risks connected 
with the above mentioned system is the underdeveloped financial market and the 
high market risk because of the great uncertainty in the environment. 
Together with the implementation of the system, the retirement age was 
increased, so workers had to exercise labour for a couple of years more. That 
decreased the number of pensioners and the retired people a worker should ‘take 
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care after’, but not the quality and productivity of labour. Moreover, there is a hot 
debate whether the old pension ceiling should be abolished. On the one hand, there 
are people, such as miners, who are hurt by the law. They are not compensated for 
the hard conditions they worked in. But, on the other hand, there are the former 
Nomenklatura managers who gave themselves excessive bonuses without making 
too much effort. So this problem has no simple solution; a careful cost-benefit 
analysis should be performed before trying to abolish the status quo. 
 
Table 1. Progress of pension reforms in the transition countries 
Country Fund. reforms Second pillar First pillar Third pillar 
Hungary  *** *** *** *** 
Poland *** *** *** *** 
Kazakhstan *** *** *** _ 
Latvia *** *** *** ** 
Croatia ** ** ** ** 
Estonia ** ** *** *** 
Romania ** * *** * 
Macedonia ** *** *** * 
Russia ** ** ** ** 
Slovenia * _ *** *** 
Bulgaria ** ** ** ** 
Czech Rep. * _ *** *** 
Slovakia * * ** *** 
Ukraine ** ** ** ** 
Armenia * _ *** * 
Georgia * _ *** *** 
Lithuania * _ *** ** 
Albania _ _ *** *** 
Kyrgyz Rep. * _ *** _ 
Uzbekistan * _ * _ 
Azerbaijan * _ * _ 
Moldova * * ** ** 
Belarus _ _ * _ 
Bosnia&Herzegovina _ _ * _ 
Tajikistan _ _ * _ 
Note: *in preparation, **approved, ***legislated 
Source: Rutkowski (2000) 
 
TOT90, which measures the initial price ratio in the pre-transition years, is 
negatively correlated to subsequent growth. That fact conforms to economic 
theory and reality. The old Soviet system featured no real exchange rate since no 
decentralized trade was allowed. In the last years of the pre-transition periods, as 
Aslund (2002) notes, different exchange rates existed for particular goods and 
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enterprises. Such exchange rates played the role of tariffs or taxes. In countries 
like Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland there was a black market exchange rate, 
commercial rate, and an official one. During the transition to market economy, a 
process of unification of exchange rates was begun, but that was only 
implemented gradually. The liberalisation of exports was the easy part because 
people were already suffering from the shortage of goods. The liberalisation of 
exports, however, proved to be more controversial and involved more 
complications.  
A depreciated exchange rate was beneficial in encouraging exports, but it 
also implied significant losses in terms of trade and thus depressed domestic 
demand. Moreover, as Bosworth and Ofer (1995) claim, it caused foreign capital 
measured in domestic wage units to increase and thus pushed transition economies 
to reorient toward labour-intensive way of goods production. In most cases, that 
was not a very appropriate measure in the post-transition period, because foreign 
competition could not put a cap on domestic prices or provide any effective 
guidance on the domestic price system. 
As a consequence, in the East European countries, state trade persisted for 
a long time and hindered external liberalization. Central European countries, on 
the contrary, performed rapid trade liberalization and reoriented their production 
towards the West. This divergence led to a structural difference between the EU 
accession countries and newly independent states (NIS). 
When most of the tariffs protecting state industries from competition were 
removed, enterprises realized they were not competitive on the world markets. 
Traditional markets were lost, and new ones had to be regained. The transition 
cost of restructuring is extremely high, though. NIS suffered from chronic CA 
deficit that persisted for a long time (table 7 in the appendix). This necessitated 
borrowing from abroad to finance the imports. The developed countries’ 
governments willingly provided such financing. The outcome of those loans is 
that taxpayers in transition countries are still contributing to those debts (Table 8 
in the appendix). 
Complete trade liberalisation poses barriers to restructuring as well. 
Workers from current industries form a strong pressure group. They already have 
well-established lobbies that push politicians to delay some reforms thus keeping 
the status quo at the expense of future growth prospects. Voters want significant 
increase in their real incomes and they want it as soon as possible. That is 
additional hindrance to reforms, since these include painful effects in the short to 
medium run. 
The political system always favours incumbents versus businesses that are 
not there yet. Employment for all workers was the social goal of the state, instead 
of pursuing maximum profit. Managers were given explicit and implicit subsidies 
to maintain such an excess employment. As a result, that produced an inefficient 
outcome. 
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NETSAV are another vital prerequisite for growth in an economy.  The 
more is saved, the higher the level of the funds that could be channelled to 
investment. The level of savings in transition countries was not determined by the 
forces of supply and demand. Former socialist countries administratively set the 
level of savings too high, without regard of the investment side. There were no 
private businesses to demand funds at that time, all investment decisions were 
made by party officials. 
People from the region had holdings of cash in order to insure themselves 
in cases of adverse income shocks. Money under mattresses was the only option 
at that time in the form of forced savings. People held them but there were no 
goods they could purchase. Then, it was easy to wipe out a significant part of 
people’s savings by monetary inflation (which was different from structural one) 
at the end of pre-transitional years. 
Moreover, citizens from such countries are very risk-averse. Still, they do 
not fully trust financial intermediaries; and we must admit they had bad 
experiences with financial institutions e.g. Ponsy schemes - pyramidal structures 
that lured with excessive rates of return citizens to deposit their money in their 
bank, with no intention to pay back. The very first depositors were paid out of the 
incoming deposits, but the majority lost everything. There was no way for such 
structures to generate such an excessive return. Bank runs and currency crises 
during the initial years of transition wiped out private savings mostly because of 
the underdeveloped financial system and the unstable boundary between state and 
private property. It is understandable, then, why people do not invest so much; 
almost all of their income goes to finance present consumption. The marginal 
value of their savings is extremely high, and every unit of currency is treasured. 
Aside from private savings, we should think about government savings. 
They are significant, but significantly negative, especially for former socialist 
countries. The state had the liability to cover the losses of unprofitable enterprises. 
That is why IMF advises such countries to follow austerity regimes, which is 
basically to increase taxes and cut spending. Increased taxes would discourage 
investment and would drive up the interest rate. Most of the citizens, being ‘target 
savers’ will realize that today they have to put less money in a deposit in order to 
obtain the same future value. Foreign advisors expect that the overall effect on 
national savings will be positive because if not so, the country can be drawn into 
a deep recession since most of the propositions impede growth instead of fostering 
or sustaining it. That is one of the critiques of IMF, that arose from monetizing 
the government debt, which is printing money, in transition countries, using such 
harsh measures for trying to curb inflation 
M2Gr has the expected negative impact on growth. In order to respond to 
the adverse output shock in the 1990s, Communist central bankers printed money 
to regain output, but that was at the cost of hyperinflation. They claimed following 
John Maynard Keynes in that expansionary monetary policy would speed up 
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growth. They did not pay much attention to the long-run inflationary effect, 
however. It must be made clear that no Central Banker at that time was a specialist 
in monetary economics but rather a loyal party member, who strictly followed all 
orders from the country rulers. 
The heads of the national banks in transition countries used the seignior age 
tax to pay the budget deficit. That monetization produced huge distortions. It led 
not only to a decrease in the real purchasing power of the households but also to 
lower real incomes over time. The so called “lost decade” in Latin America fully 
deserved its name. 
The growth in M2 captures the effect of excessive credit, mostly in the form 
of connected lending. The state banks were a lot similar to Western non-for-profit 
organizations. They were not really screening worthwhile projects, but allocating 
credit to loss-making state enterprises. When the loans were not repaid, the debt 
was rolled over and a new loan was granted. In this way, whole credit lines existed 
in 1991 in most transition countries. 
That factor is important from an institutional point of view as well. There 
was no clear notion of private property. The existence of soft budget constraints, 
which meant that almost infinite amounts of money could be spent regardless of 
the funds at hand, was a hindrance for the establishment of bankruptcy laws and 
liquidation procedures. Enterprise directors, which were appointed loyal 
Communist party members and incompetent in financial issues in most of the 
cases, engaged in rent-seeking activities instead of managing the enterprises in the 
best way they could. The absence of profit led to the degradation of equipment 
and human capital. There was no innovation, no new practices, etc. 
Some of the managers used the existing loopholes in the law and sold 
enterprise assets, thus enriching themselves a great deal. The gap in the budget 
exploded from the abysmal inters enterprise debts that were never paid. At one 
moment, the debts of the enterprises exceeded manifold their market price, which 
made them unattractive for privatization later on.  
Even nowadays, insecurity of property rights makes firms reluctant to 
reinvest their profits even when they are high because of the fear of the predatory 
environment. Managers are very risk-averse and prefer to play safe. Institutional 
economics explains the collapse of the market but it does not say how to build one.  
In my view, experts in financial law in collaboration with the Western 
advisors have to draft the necessary laws to be passed through the Parliaments of 
transition countries in the very near future. The major loopholes, allowing for 
arbitrage opportunities, have to be closed. Some of the most problematic areas in 
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5. Concluding remarks 
Our study found significant the 1991 net savings, life expectancy, terms of 
trade in 1990, growth of M2 aggregate in explaining growth in the subsequent 
decade. The results follow the basic Solow’s logic. Our findings also complement 
the results obtained by Barro (1991) and Mankiw et. al (1992). The value-added 
of this paper is that it provides a new perspective on the growth process in the 
transition countries on their way to the EU. Special emphasis is put on healthcare 
and social security as potential threats to the upward trend in the national income. 
This paper provides some important policy implications. The expected 
accession to NATO, and subsequently, EU will act as a signalling tool to the 
investors. That however, is not enough for a significant inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Some soft factors, such as court system and financial 
regulations are of higher importance for the prospective investor in defining 
property rights and enforcing the rule of law. The author was pleased to notice 
that the Bulgarian 2004 state budget featured a greater proportion of money to be 
allocated to the Ministries of Justice and Education. 
Larger and better-educated labour force, with skills demanded by the market 
conditions would also bring higher growth. Thus, a bigger portion of the funds from 
the state budget should be directed towards these spheres, as the marginal returns 
there are the highest. Here is the business social role to establish the connection with 
the institutions for higher education. Companies have to convey the message of 
professions currently in demand, as it was done with lawyers in Bulgaria. A ranking 
carried out by businesses should be published so as to become transparent which 
graduates from which universities are of higher quality. 
More savings, low inflation and macroeconomic stability, together with 
better financial intermediation will result in more loanable funds available. The 
latter should be directed to the owners of small and medium enterprises that need 
fresh capital in order to expand. More taxes will enter the state budget, and more 
money will be available for government investment and spending. A virtuous 
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Table 1. Countries in transition: annual percent change in real GDP  
 1981-91 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Albania –2.6 –7.2 9.6 9.4 8.9 9.1 -7.0 7.9 7.2 
Belarus n.a –9.7 –7.0 –12.6 –10.4 2.8 10.5 11.6 -2.4 
Bosnia & Herz. n.a n.a n.a n.a 32.4 85.8 39.9 12.8 8.6 
Bulgaria  0.3 –7.3 –1.5 1.7 2.2 –10.9 –6.9 3.5 2.4 
Croatia  n.a n.a 8.0 5.9 5.7 5.9 6.8 2.5 –0.3 
Czech Republic  n.a n.a 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.8 –1.0 –2.2 –0.2 
Czhechoslovakia 0.3 -8.5 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Estonia  n.a –21.6 –8.2 –2.0 4.3 3.9 10.6 4.7 –1.1 
Hungary  –0.4 – 3.1 –0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.5 
Latvia  n.a –35.2 – 16.1 0.6 –0.8 3.3 8.6 3.9 0.1 
Lithuania  n.a –21.3 –16.2 –9.8 3.3 4.7 7.3 5.1 –4.1 
Macedonia  n.a n.a –7.5 –1.8 –1.1 1.2 1.4 2.9 2.7 
Moldova  n.a –29.7 –1.2 –31.2 –1.4 –7.8 1.3 –6.5 –4.4 
Poland  0.2 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 
Romania  –0.8 –8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 –6.1 –5.4 –3.2 
Slovak Rep. n.a n.a –3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.5 4.4 1.9 
Slovenia  n.a  n.a 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.5 4.6 3.9 4.9 
Ukraine  n.a –17.0 –14.2 –22.9 –12.2 –10.0 –3.0 –1.9 –0.4 
Yugoslavia –2.3 –34.0 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a  n.a 
Russia  n.a – 19.4 –10.4 –11.6 –4.2 –3.4 0.9 –4.9 3.2 
Armenia  n.a –52.6 –14.1 5.4 6.9 5.9 3.3 7.2 3.3 
Azerbaijan  n.a –22.7 –23.1 –19.7 -11.8 1.3 5.8 10.0 7.4 
Georgia n.a –44.9 –29.3 –10.4 2.6 10.5 10.7 2.9 3.3 
Kazakhstan  n.a –5.3 –9.2 –12.6 –8.2 0.5 1.7 –1.9 1.7 
Kyrgyz Rep.  n.a –13.9 –15.5 –19.8 – 5.8 7.1 9.9 2.1 3.6 
Mongolia  3.5 –9.5 –3.0 2.3 6.3 2.4 4.0 3.5 3.3 
Tajikistan  n.a  –28.9 –11.1 –21.4 –12.5 –4.4 1.7 5.3 3.7 
Turkmenistan  n.a –5.3 –10.0 –17.3 –7.2 –6.7 –11.3 5.0 16.0 
Uzbekistan  n.a –11.1 –2.3 –4.2 –0.9 1.6 2.5 4.3 4.4 
Note: Data for some countries refer to real net material product (NMP) or are estimates 
based on NMP. For many countries, figures for recent years are IMF staff estimates. The 
figures should be interpreted only as indicative of broad orders of magnitude because 
reliable, comparable data are not generally available. In particular, the growth of output of 
new private enterprises of the informal economy is not fully reflected in the recent figures. 
Source: World Economic Outlook 
 
Table 2. Countries in transition: annual percent change in consumer prices  
 82–91  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Albania  3.1 226.0 85.0 22.6 7.8 12.7 33.2 20.6 0.4 
Belarus  n.a 969.0 1,190.2 2,434.1 709.3 52.7 63.8 73.0 293.7 
Bosnia& Herz n.a n.a n.a n.a –4.0 – 25.0 14.0 10.8 5.0 
Bulgaria  21.3 82.0 72.8 96.0 62.1 123.0 1,082.2 22.3 2.1 
Croatia  n.a n.a 1,516.6 97.5 2.0 3.5 3.6 5.7 4.2 
Czech Rep n.a n.a 20.8 10.0 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.6 2.1 
Czechoslovak. 7.0 11.0 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Estonia  n.a 1,069.0 89.8 47.7 29.0 23.1 11.2 8.2 3.3 
Hungary  13.5 22.8 22.4 18.8 28.3 23.5 18.3 14.3 10.0 
Latvia   n.a 951.3 109.1 35.8 25.1 17.6 8.0 4.7 2.4 
Lithuania  n.a 1,021.0 410.4 72.1 39.5 24.7 8.8 5.1 0.8 
Macedonia n.a n.a 338.7 127.5 15.7 2.3 2.6 –0.1 –0.7 
Moldova   n.a 1,276.0 788.5 329.6 30.2 23.5 11.8 7.7 39.3 
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Poland  77.7 43.0 35.3 32.2 27.9 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.3 
Romania  22.5 210.4 256.1 136.7 32.3 38.8 154.8 59.1 45.8 
Slovak Rep  n.a n.a 23.0 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.7 
Slovenia  n.a n.a 32.9 21.0 13.5 9.9 8.4 8.0 6.1 
Ukraine  n.a 1,210.0 4,734.9 891.2 376.4 80.2 15.9 10.6 22.7 
Yugoslavia  155.9 6,146.6 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Russia  n.a 1,734.7 874.7 307.4 197.4 47.6 14.7 27.7 85.9 
Armenia  n.a 824.5 3,731.8 5,273.4 176.7 18.7 14.0 8.7 0.7 
Azerbaijan  n.a 912.6 1,129.7 1,664.0 412.0 19.7 3.5 –0.8 –8.3 
Georgia  n.a 887.4 3,125.4 15606.5 162.7 39.4 7.1 3.6 19.1 
Kazakhstan  n.a 1,515.7 1,662.3 1,879.9 176.3 39.1 17.4 7.3 8.4 
Kyrgyz Rep n.a 853.8 772.4 190.1 39.1 31.9 23.4 10.3 35.7 
Mongolia  2.1 202.6 268.4 87.6 56.8 46.8 36.6 9.4 7.6 
Tajikistan  n.a 1,156.7 2,194.9 350.4 610.0 418.2 88.0 43.2 27.6 
Turkmenistan  n.a 492.9 3,102.4 1,748.3 1,005.2 992.4 83.7 16.8 23.5 
Uzbekistan  n.a 645.2 534.2 1,568.3 304.6 54.0 70.9 29.0 29.1 
Note: For many countries, inflation for the earlier years is measured on the basis of a 
retail price index. Consumer price indices with a broader and more up-to-date coverage 
are typically used for more recent years. 
Source: World Economic Outlook 
 







































Albania 629 102 26 0 1494 45 36.9 0.78 
Armenia 2453 21 11 0 3143 74 0 n.a 
Azerbaijan 2466 33 22 2 3270 75 0 0.9 
Belarus 6667 45 22 0 1435 75 0.1 0.92 
Bulgaria 5740 15 11 0 1574 43 50.6 0.75 
Croatia 6919 6 10 0 913 44 74.7 0.85 
Czech Rep. 8207 10 7 0 559 43 12.2 0.91 
Estonia 6475 27 20 0 1449 51 0 1 
Georgia 2203 19 22 1 3069 70 0 0.89 
Hungary  6081 10 14 0 1002 41 64 0.75 
Kazakhstan 4133 18 29 2 5180 75 0 0.96 
Kyrgyz Rep. 2770 21 33 0 1293 75 0 0.99 
Latvia 5204 31 19 0 1293 51 0 0.89 
Lithuania 3603 34 27 0 1299 51 0.2 0.88 
Macedonia 3720 6 12 0 1522 44 0 0.57 
Moldova 3562 25 32 0 1673 52 0 0.77 
Poland 5687 17 13 1 995 42 63.4 0.82 
Romania 3535 3 14 1 1637 43 2.9 0.92 
Russia  5627 18 15 2 2088 74 12.1 0.91 
Slovak Rep. 6969 10 7 0 824 43 6.8 0.96 
Slovenia 11525 5 5 0 815 44 0 0.9 
Tajikistan 1778 22 27 0 4938 75 8.6 1.01 
Turkmenistan 3308 34 29 2 4254 75 0 n.a 
Ukraine 4658 25 21 1 1664 75 0 0.91 
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Uzbekistan 2577 24 31 1 4788 75 0 0.98 
         
Memorandum 
Items5 
        
All transition 4660 23 19 1 2087 58 13.3 0.88 
All CEE 5901 18 12 0 1134 43 31.1 0.82 
CEE: early 
transformers 
7565 9 9 0 851 43 36.8 0.87 
CEE: late 
transformers 
3406 32 16 0 1557 44 22.6 0.76 
Baltics  5094 31 22 0 1347 51 0.1 0.93 
Other FSU 3517 25 25 1 3066 73 1.7 0.92 
Notes: 
1. Calculated by dividing PPP adjusted GDP by total population 
2. Share of intra-FSU trade in 1990 
3. Share of agriculture in 1989 according to DDGT 
4. Natural resource endowment according to DDGT (1997); 0 = poor, 1 = moderate, 2 
= rich 
5. CEE: early reformers refer to Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia. CEE: late reformers refer to Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, 
Yugoslavia and Romania. Baltics refer to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Other former 
Soviet Union refer to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, The Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Simple 
average for values. 
Sources: World Development Indicator; World Economic Outlook; de Melo (DDGT) 
(1997); Krajnyak and Zettelmeyer (1997) 
 
Table 4. Gross fixed investment, 1992 – 1999 (annual percentage growth) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Central Europe         
Poland 3.6 4.3 8.3 16.6 19.7 21.7 14.5 6.9 
Czech Rep. 16.5 0.2 9.1 19.8 8.2 -4.3 -3.8 -5.5 
Slovakia -3.3 -5.4 -4.6 5.3 39.8 14.5 11 -18.2 
Hungary -2.6 2 12.5 -4.3 6.7 8.8 11.4 5.8 
South-East Europe         
Romania 11 8.3 20.7 6.9 3.9 -15.9 -19.2 -10.8 
Bulgaria -7.3 -17.5 1.1 16.1 -21.2 -23.9 16.3 28.8 
Baltics         
Estonia -43.7 6.3 8.5 0.3 11.4 17.5 8.1 -14.1 
Latvia -28.7 -15.8 n.a. n.a. 22.3 20.7 11.1 -9.1 
Lithuania n.a. n.a. -14.4 7.1 -2.4 4.8 11.2 n.a. 
CIS         
Russia 27.2 -25.8 -26 -7.5 -16 -5 -3.2 -1.7 
Belarus -18.6 -7.5 -13.7 -29.5 -3.3 23.6 11.8 n.a. 
Ukraine -15 -30.5 -41 -30.8 -22.7 2.1 -4.3 n.a. 
Moldova -32.4 -5.4 -12.9 -18.5 12.4 3.7 0.7 -19.5 
Armenia -87.2 -7.8 -23.9 -17.3 10.3 2.1 11.9 n.a. 
Azerbaijan n.a. n.a. n.a. -34.5 102.4 50.3 16.8 n.a. 
Georgia n.a. n.a. n.a. 618.6 57.7 41.4 10.3 n.a. 
Kazakhstan n.a. -10.2 -13 -36.6 -24.7 3.6 1.7 n.a. 
Kyrgyzstan n.a. n.a. -66.4 248.7 17.3 -38.7 -0.8 -11.9 
Tajikistan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Turkmenistan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Uzbekistan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: World Bank 
 
Table 5. General government balances, 1992-1999 (as percentage of GDP) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Central Europe         
Poland -4.9 -2.4 -2.2 -3.1 -3.3 -3.1 -3.2 -3.3 
Czech Rep. -3.1 0.5 -1.1 -1.4 -0.9 -1.7 -2 -3.3 
Slovakia -11.9 -6 -1.5 0.4 -1.3 -5.2 -5 -3.6 
Hungary -7.2 -6.6 -8.4 -6.7 -5 -6.6 -5.6 -5.6 
South-East Europe         
Romania -4.6 -0.4 -2.2 -2.5 -3.9 -4.6 -5 -3.5 
Bulgaria -2.9 -8.7 -3.9 -6.3 -12.7 -2.5 1.5 -1 
Baltics         
Estonia -0.3 -0.7 1.3 -1.3 -1.9 2.2 -0.3 -4.6 
Latvia -0.8 0.6 -4.4 -3.9 -1.8 0.3 -0.8 -4.2 
Lithuania 0.5 -5.3 -4.8 -4.5 -4.5 -1.8 -5.8 -8.6 
CIS         
Russia -18.9 -7.3 -10.4 -6 -8.9 -7.6 -8 -1 
Belarus -3.3 -5.2 -1.3 -6.9 -1.9 -1.2 -0.6 -5.6 
Ukraine -25.4 -16.2 -7.7 -6.1 -6.1 -5 -3 -2.5 
Moldova -26.6 -7.5 -5.9 -5.8 -9.7 -7.5 -3.3 -3.2 
Armenia -13.9 -54.7 -16.5 -9 -8.6 -5.8 -3.7 -5.9 
Azerbaijan 2.7 -15.3 -12.1 -4.9 -2.8 -1.6 -4.2 -5.4 
Georgia -25.4 -26.2 -7.4 -5.3 -4.9 -7 -6.5 -6.7 
Kazakhstan -7.9 -4.1 -7.7 -3.4 -5.3 -7 -7.7 -5.3 
Kyrgyzstan -17.4 -14.4 -5.7 -8.4 -8.8 -8.8 -11.2 -12.8 
Tajikistan -30.5 -20.9 -5.2 -5.3 -5.8 -3.3 -3.8 -3.1 
Turkmenistan -9.4 -4.1 -2.3 -2.6 0.3 0 -2.7 0.9 




Table 6a. Private sector as share of GDP, 1991-200 (percentage of GDP)  
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Central Europe           
Poland 40 45 50 55 60 60 65 65 65 70 
Czech Rep. 15 30 45 65 70 75 75 75 80 80 
Slovakia 15 30 45 55 60 70 75 75 75 75 
Hungary 30 40 50 55 60 70 75 85 80 80 
South-East 
Europe 
          
Romania 25 25 35 40 45 55 60 60 60 60 
Bulgaria 20 25 35 40 50 55 60 65 70 70 
Baltics           
Estonia 10 25 40 55 65 70 70 70 75 75 
Latvia 10 25 30 40 55 60 60 65 65 65 
Lithuania 10 20 35 60 65 70 70 70 70 70 
CIS           
Russia 5 25 40 50 55 60 70 70 70 70 
Belarus 5 10 10 15 15 15 20 20 20 20 
Ukraine 10 10 15 40 45 50 55 55 55 60 
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Moldova 10 10 15 20 30 40 45 50 45 50 
Armenia 30 35 40 40 45 50 55 60 60 60 
Azerbaijan 10 10 10 20 25 25 40 45 45 45 
Georgia 15 15 20 20 30 50 55 60 60 60 
Kazakhstan 5 10 10 20 25 40 55 55 60 60 
Kyrgyzstan 15 20 25 30 40 50 60 60 60 60 
Tajikistan 10 10 10 15 15 20 20 30 30 40 
Turkmenistan 10 10 10 15 15 20 25 25 25 25 
Uzbekistan 10 10 15 20 30 40 45 45 45 45 
Source: EBRD (2000) / The estimates are midyear. 
 
Table 6b. Real total consumption expenditure, 1989-1999 (indices, 1989 = 
100 or earliest year available thereafter) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Central 
Europe 
           
Poland 100 88.3 94.9 98.2 103 107 110.5 118.4 125.6 130.8 136.4 
Czech Rep. 100 104.9 85.5 88.4 90.2 94.5 97.2 103 104.6 102.3 103.2 
Slovakia 100 103.3 76.9 75.4 74.2 71.5 73.9 82.4 86.5 91.1 89.2 
Hungary 100 97.3 92.2 92.8 97.9 95.6 89.3 86.6 88.6 91.7 95.6 
South-East 
Europe 
           
Romania 100 108.9 96 90.7 91.8 95.3 105.5 112.9 108.1 103.7 99.1 
Bulgaria 100 100.6 92.3 89.4 86.2 82.3 80.7 75.3 64 68.8 72 
Baltics            
Estonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 101.2 110.4 116.5 124.4 131.3 131.8 
Latvia n.a. 100 76.7 49.2 46.5 47.4 47 50.8 52.7 56 55.5 
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 108.2 116.4 135.4 120.2 
CIS            
Russia n.a. 100 93.9 89 88.1 85.8 83.3 80.7 82.7 76.7 72.6 
Belarus n.a. 100 93.4 84 82.1 72.1 65.3 67.4 73.8 81.2 84.6 
Ukraine n.a. 100 94.3 88.6 72 65 62.6 57.4 56.4 56.3 56.6 
Moldova n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 82.6 90.3 99.7 111.5 109.3 92.9 
Armenia n.a. 100 97.4 84.9 66.4 68.9 74.5 76.8 81.7 85.4 85.7 
Azerbaijan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 80.3 78 84.3 93.2 103.8 n.a. 
Georgia n.a. 100 79.2 77.1 45.4 42.4 46.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Kazakhstan n.a. 100 96.8 96.1 84.9 67.7 55 51.3 51.8 49 48.3 
Kyrgyzstan n.a. n.a. 100 87.2 77.1 62 52 55.3 50.8 58.5 60.9 
Source: ECE (2000) qt. in Aslund (2002) 
 
Table 7a. Unemployment, 1991-1999 (percentage of labor force) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Central Europe          
Poland 11.8 14.3 16.4 16 14.9 13.2 8.6 10.4 13 
Czech Rep. 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5 5.2 7.5 9.4 
Slovakia  10.4 14.4 14.6 13.1 12.8 12.5 15.6 19.2 
Hungary* 7.4 9.3 11.9 10.7 10.2 9.9 8.7 7.8 7 
South-East Europe          
Romania* 3 8.2 10.4 10.1 8.2 6.5 7.4 10.4 11.5 
Bulgaria 11.1 15.3 16.4 12.8 11.1 12.5 13.7 12.2 16 
Baltics          
Estonia n.a. n.a. 6.6 7.6 9.8 10 9.7 9.9 12.3 
Latvia 0.6 3.9 8.7 16.7 18.1 19.4 14.8 14 14.4 
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Lithuania 0.3 1.3 4.4 3.8 17.5 16.4 14.1 13.3 14.1 
CIS          
Russia 0 5.3 6 7.8 9 9.9 11.2 13.3 11.7 
Belarus* 0.1 0.5 1.4 2.1 2.7 3.9 2.8 2.3 2.1 
Ukraine 0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.3 2.3 3.7 4.3 
Moldova* n.a. 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.9 2 
Armenia* 4 3.5 6.3 5.8 8.4 10.1 11.3 8.9 11.6 
Azerbaijan n.a. 15.4 9.6 10.4 11.7 12.1 12.7 12.9 13.9 
Georgia** 0.2 5.4 9.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 7.5 14.7 14.9 
Kazakhstan 0 0.4 0.6 7.5 11 13 13 14 14.1 
Kyrgyzstan* 0 n.a. n.a. 3.1 4.4 6 4.3 n.a. n.a. 
Tajikistan* n.a. 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Turkmenistan*** 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Uzbekistan* 0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 
*Officially registered unemployment 
** Up until 1996, registered unemployment, total unemployment thereafter 
*** Every Turkmen citizen is guaranteed employment, thus official unemployment does 
not exist. 1991 and 1995 figures are household survey estimates, but do not take account 
of substantial public sector overemployment. 
Source: EBRD (2000) 
 
Table 7b. Current account balance, 1990-1999 (percentage of GDP) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Central Europe           
Poland 1 -2.6 1.1 -0.7 0.7 4.5 -1 -3.2 -4.4 -7.6 
Czech Rep. -2.8 1.2 -1 1.3 -1.9 -2.6 -7.4 -6.1 -2.4 -2 
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. -4.7 4.6 2.1 -10.6 -9.6 -9.7 -5.5 
Hungary 0.4 0.8 0.9 -9 -9.4 -5.6 -3.7 -2.1 -4.9 -4.2 
South-East 
Europe 
          
Romania -9.6 -3.5 -8 -4.5 -1.4 -6.3 -8.9 -6.8 -7 -3.8 
Bulgaria -8.2 -1 -4.2 -10.1 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 4.2 -0.5 -5.5 
Baltics           
Estonia n.a. n.a. 3.3 1.3 -7.3 -4.4 -9.1 -12.2 -9.2 -5.7 
Latvia n.a. n.a. 1.7 19.1 5.5 -0.4 -5.4 -6.1 -10.7 -10.3 
Lithuania n.a. n.a. 10.6 -3.2 -2.2 -10.2 -9.2 -10.2 -12.1 -11.2 
CIS           
Russia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.1 1.4 1.7 0.1 0.8 13.6 
Belarus n.a. n.a. n.a. -11.9 -9.1 -4.4 -3.7 -5.8 -6.9 -3.3 
Ukraine n.a. n.a. -2.9 -2.4 -3.1 -3.1 -2.7 -2.7 -3.1 2.7 
Moldova n.a. n.a. -3 -11.9 -7 -6.8 -11.9 -14.8 -19 -2.8 
Armenia n.a. n.a. -70.4 -14.3 -16 -17 -18.2 -18.7 -20.6 -15 
Azerbaijan n.a. n.a. -12.2 -12.2 -9.4 -13.2 -25.8 -23.1 -32.6 -15 
Georgia n.a. n.a. -33.5 -40.2 -22.3 -7.5 -6.1 -11 -11.2 -7.9 
Kazakhstan n.a. n.a. -31.5 -7.2 -7.8 -1.3 -3.6 -3.6 -5.6 -1.1 
Kyrgyzstan n.a. n.a. -1.8 -18.5 -7.6 -15.7 -23.3 -7.9 -22.4 -14.9 
Tajikistan n.a. n.a. 18.4 -28.9 -20.2 -12.8 -7.4 -6.1 -9.2 -3.3 
Turkmenistan n.a. n.a. 68.5 14.1 4 0.9 0.1 -24.2 -38.8 -28.2 
Uzbekistan n.a. n.a. -12 -8.4 2.1 -0.2 -8.1 -5.1 -0.4 -2.7 
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Table 8. External debt, 1991-1999 (percentage of GDP) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Central Europe          
Poland 61.5 56.4 54.9 47.1 38 35.2 36 36.2 38.3 
Czech Rep. 26.4 23.8 24.3 26 31.8 36 40.6 43.1 42.3 
Slovakia n.a. 24.1 26.6 32 30.9 38.8 48.5 55.9 53.1 
Hungary 67.8 58.1 63.7 68.7 70.4 61.1 51.9 56.9 59.9 
South-East Europe          
Romania 7.4 16.5 16.1 18.3 24.1 29.5 30.1 24 27.1 
Bulgaria 157.4 160.4 127.7 116.8 77.4 97.7 95.8 83.7 80.5 
Baltics          
Estonia n.a. n.a. 18.2 23.4 22.1 31.8 55.3 55.6 56 
Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 31.8 39.4 48.4 50.3 60.7 
Lithuania n.a. 3.1 12.2 12.4 22.8 26.4 32.8 33.3 40.8 
CIS          
Russia 161.2 128.2 66.9 43.7 36.6 32.3 29.8 58.6 87.1 
Belarus n.a. 10.7 27.7 45.2 25.8 15.5 17.2 18.3 31.1 
Ukraine n.a. 2 11.2 19.1 22 20.6 23.5 28 37.3 
Moldova n.a. 1.3 20.4 53.1 46.3 48.1 54.3 59.7 105.7 
Armenia n.a. n.a. n.a. 30.9 29.2 38.4 48 42.9 46.3 
Azerbaijan n.a. n.a. 4 18.3 17.6 14.7 10.2 12.1 24.1 
Georgia n.a. 12.8 67.8 80 63.7 44.9 44.6 47.2 63 
Kazakhstan n.a. 24.5 33.4 28 21 21.3 28.6 37.3 50.1 
Kyrgyzstan n.a. n.a. 33 37.3 51.2 63.2 76.8 89.5 138.7 
Tajikistan n.a. n.a. 73.3 93.8 158 83.8 98.5 90 94.9 
Turkmenistan n.a. n.a. 3.6 207.8 36.6 34.3 65.3 75.6 112.2 
Uzbekistan n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 20.2 30.6 56.5 72.7 109.5 
Source: EBRD 
 
Table 9. Foreign direct investment inflow per capita, 1993-1999 (US$) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Central Europe        
Poland 9 14 23 71 79 128 172 
Czech Rep. 59 83 243 123 124 256 476 
Slovakia 30 35 34 33 33 70 130 
Hungary 214 111 432 195 163 144 140 
South-East Europe        
Romania 2 19 16 9 54 92 42 
Bulgaria 7 12 12 12 60 65 98 
Baltics        
Estonia 76 158 132 71 89 397 154 
Latvia 22 57 64 92 206 124 136 
Lithuania 11 16 15 41 89 249 129 
CIS        
Russia 7 7 10 14 25 12 5 
Belarus  1 1 7 19 14 22 
Ukraine  2 2 10 12 15 10 
Moldova  5 15 13 15 20 8 
Armenia  1 5 6 14 58 34 
Azerbaijan  7 28 87 144 129 64 
Georgia   1 5 44 41 18 
Kazakhstan 18 19 43 67 84 74 106 
Kyrgyzstan  6 20 7 18 23 8 
Tajikistan  2 2 2 5 4 3 
Turkmenistan  26 25 28 23 13 18 
Uzbekistan 2 4 5 2 7 9 8 
Source: EBRD 
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Table 10. Male life expectancy, 1989-1998 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Central Europe           
Poland 66.8 66.5 66.1 66.7 67.4 67.5 67.6 68.1 68.5 68.9 
Czech Rep. 68.1 67.5 68.2 68.5 69.3 69.5 70 70.4 70.5 71.1 
Slovakia 66.9 66.6 66.8 67.6 68.4 68.3 68.4 68.8 68.9 68.6 
Hungary 65.4 65.1 65 64.6 64.5 64.8 65.3 66.1 66.4 66.1 
South-East 
Europe 
          
Romania 66.6 66.6 66.6 66.6 66.1 65.9 65.7 65.3 65.2 65.5 
Bulgaria 68.6 68.1 68 68 67.7 67.2 67.1 67.1 67.2 67.4 
Baltics           
Estonia 65.7 64.6 64.4 63.5 62.4 61.1 61.7 64.5 64.5 64.4 
Latvia 65.3 64.2 63.8 63.3 61.6 60.7 60.8 63.3 64.2 64.1 
Lithuania 66.9 66.6 65.3 64.9 63.3 62.8 63.6 65 65.9 66.5 
CIS           
Russia 64.4 63.8 63.5 62 58.9 57.3 58.3 59.6 60.9 61.3 
Belarus 67.1 66.3 65.5 64.9 63.8 63.5 62.9 63.1 62.9 62.7 
Ukraine 66.1 65.6 64 64 63 62.8 61.8 61.9 61.9 61.9 
Moldova 65.5 65 64.3 63.9 64 62.3 61.8 62.9 62.9 62.9 
Armenia 69 68.4 68.9 67.7 67.9 68.1 68.9 69.3 70.3 70.8 
Azerbaijan 66.6 67 66.3 65.4 65.2 65.2 65.2 66.3 67.4 67.9 
Georgia 68.1 68.7 n.a. 68.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 68.5 68.7 
Kazakhstan 63.9 63.8 63.3 63 61.8 60.6 57.9 58.5 59 59.2 
Kyrgyzstan 64.2 64.2 64.6 64.2 62.9 61.6 61.4 62.3 62.6 63.1 
Tajikistan 66.2 66.8 67.6 65.4 n.a. 63.4 65.5 65.5 65.6 65.7 
Turkmenistan 61.8 62.9 62.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 62.3 62.5 
Uzbekistan 66 66.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 66.1 66.3 
 
Table 11. Monetization ( M2/GDP) in transition countries, 1997 




















Slovak Rep. 68 
Czech Republic 71 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Jarocinski  
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Table 12. Total expenditure on health, 1990-1991 and 1997 (percentage of GDP) 
 1990-1 1997 
Central Europe   
Poland 5 6.2 
Czech Rep. 5.9 7.1 
Slovakia 5.4 6.7 
Hungary 6.7 6.4 
South-East Europe   
Romania 2.9 4.2* 
Bulgaria 5.1 4.3 
Baltics   
Estonia n.a. 6.4 
Latvia 2.5 6.2 
Lithuania 3 8.3 
CIS   
Russia 2.6 5.7** 
Belarus 3.5 6.3 
Ukraine 3.3 5.4 
Moldova 4.8 6.7 
Armenia 2.7 7.8** 
Azerbaijan 2.9 7.2 
Georgia 3.2 4.7 
Kazakhstan 4.4 4.8 
Kyrgyzstan 4.4 3.6 
*1996 data 
**1995 data 
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Appendix 3. Graphs 
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